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 “FOR GOD’S SAKE, PUBLISH; ONLY BE SURE OF YOUR RIGHTS”:
VIRGINIA WOOLF, COPYRIGHT, AND SCHOLARSHIP
by Robert Spoo
In March 1928, Virginia Woolf wrote to Vita Sackville-West after learning that the latter wanted to translate Rainer Maria Rilke’s Duino Elegies for the Hogarth Press: “For God’s sake, translate Rilke: only be sure of your rights.”1 Th e legal triangle im-
plied here is one with which modernist scholars are familiar: a publisher warning an author 
that, for a project to go forward, copyright permissions will have to be obtained from a 
literary estate. (Rilke had died in 1926.) Now that legislative extensions of copyright have 
ensured that modernism will remain “propertized” for some time to come, scholars must 
gird themselves for the continuing challenge of permissions-gathering. I off er here some 
thoughts, as a copyright lawyer and modernist scholar, about intellectual property and 
Woolf studies.2 I will begin by making a few general observations about literary estates 
and then go on to discuss the Woolf copyrights in various contexts. Because permissions 
are necessary only when scholars cannot avail themselves of any privilege or exception 
recognized by law, I will stress aspects of the law that allow scholars (and publishers with 
a little knowledge and mettle) to bypass the permissions game.
Literary estates come in many fl avors. Some encourage scholarship; some do not. 
On a spectrum stretching from scholar-friendly to downright diffi  cult, the estates of Ezra 
Pound and H.D. would nestle in the friendly zone, while the James Joyce estate would be 
practically off  the chart in the other direction. Th e Woolf estate appears to fall somewhere 
between these extremes, though closer to friendly than to diffi  cult, at least in ordinary 
cases. Th is is no doubt partly due to the Woolf estate’s use of the Society of Authors in 
London as an agent for handling routine scholarly requests.  By “routine requests” I mean, 
chiefl y, requests for permission to quote from Woolf ’s published works. Such requests are 
usually granted, and license fees are charged.
Use of the Society of Authors as a permissions clearinghouse is generally a good thing 
for scholarship. It reduces what legal analysts call “transaction costs”—the hassles and un-
certainties of bargaining with a rights-holder—and prevents “market failure,” where a use 
is refused altogether so that neither the scholar nor the estate benefi ts. One reason why the 
Joyce Estate has become a byword for intransigency among scholars is that some twenty 
years ago, the Estate stopped using the Society for routine academic requests and, gradu-
ally over time, came to insist that requests of all types be directed to the Estate’s trustee 
and to the author’s grandson. Th e result has been a loss of objectivity and effi  ciency in 
the processing of permissions requests, and a dramatic increase in uncertainty and anxiety 
among scholars. Th ere is much to be said for a more dispassionate referee, like the Society, 
that treats requests largely as a business matter.
But there are drawbacks. Academics can become too dependent on the designated 
referee and forget that permissions are not always necessary. Quoting from copyrighted 
works for the purpose of criticism or scholarship is a core “fair use.”  In the U.S., fair use is 
especially likely to apply when a use is “transformative,” that is, when it “adds something 
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new, with a further purpose or diff erent character, altering the [copyrighted work] with 
new expression, meaning, or message.”3 Reasonable quotations from To the Lighthouse 
to support an analysis of Lily Briscoe as an embodiment of modernism is the kind of 
transformative purpose for which the fair-use privilege was evolved. Th e U.S. Copyright 
Act stresses that fair use applies to both published and unpublished works, so that short, 
transformative quotations from an unpublished Woolf letter or manuscript would also be 
permissible, at least within the U.S.4 (Th e parallel doctrine of “fair dealing” in Canada, 
the U.K., and other countries is somewhat more restrictive and is sometimes treated as 
not applying to unpublished writings.) Scholars should become familiar and comfortable 
with fair use, and academic publishers should not allow the privilege to atrophy through 
routine insistence on permissions-getting, even though requests can readily be referred to 
the Society of Authors. (Th e Society’s website notes the validity of fair dealing and opines 
as to when—in terms of word counts—fair dealing might apply.5 Bear in mind, though, 
that the law does not defi ne fair use or fair dealing as a certain quantity of quoted words; 
fair use is not a numbers game, but rather a fl exible doctrine that permits a range of uses 
in appropriate contexts.)
What types of requests, then, does the Society of Authors regard as not routine?  Jeremy 
Crow of the Society has explained that the Society typically refers requests for “unusually 
substantial usages” or “unusual exploitations” to estates themselves.6 Th ese would include 
requests to prepare a new edition of a novel; to adapt a work for the stage or cinema; or to 
use a work in advertising or on merchandise. Th ese uses are also ones that would not likely 
qualify as fair use or fair dealing. Another type of request that the Society often refers to 
estates concerns previously unpublished material.  Sometimes “arrangements have already 
been made for initial publication elsewhere,” or an estate believes that another project is 
“the most appropriate place for fi rst publication.”7 In such cases, an estate is protecting 
what the law refers to as “the right of fi rst publication,” a concept that combines the right 
to decide where to publish a work fi rst and the right to determine whether to divulge the 
work at all. It is understandable that an estate might want to invoke this right as a way of 
controlling the fi rst appearance of a work.  But I have seen the concept abused as a strategy 
for preventing any appearance of historically important documents created by famous, 
long-dead authors. A short quotation from an unpublished manuscript in a scholarly 
article or book should not interfere with the right of fi rst publication.
Estates sometimes use copyrights to protect more than the right of fi rst publication. 
Not infrequently, they use copyrights to ensure “respect for the known wishes of the deceased 
author, and the protection of the feelings and privacy of living persons mentioned in the 
works.”8 Here we enter controversial terrain. Th e “known wishes” of a dead author may be 
diffi  cult to determine, and it is not always clear who is in a better position to know authors’ 
wishes—estates or scholars—inasmuch as both groups are susceptible to self-serving bias. 
Th e issue becomes even more complicated when it is recalled that much of the unpublished 
material on which “privacy” claims are based is not private at all—in the sense of physically 
or legally unavailable—but rather held in archives to which the public has access. Scholars 
can learn the secrets buried in these documents; they just can’t safely quote their fi ndings in 
publications, for fear of copyright threats. Th ey can kiss but not tell.
So when an estate purports to be using its copyrights to protect the privacy of the 
living or the dead, it is well to take a closer look. Copyright is a limited right, granted for 
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a fi xed term of years, subject to fair use and other exemptions, and powerless to prevent 
the disclosure of facts or ideas contained in a protected writing. Suppose that Virginia 
Woolf had confi ded the following to an unpublished scrap of paper dated September 
1922 and held at the University of Sussex: “We saw Tom last night, dreadfully nervous 
over the coming reception of his poem. He had on again his marmoreal mask and manner, 
which always unnerve me. I think he had painted his lips and applied a cadaverous green 
powder to his cheeks and forehead.” If a scholar encountered this (wholly invented) entry 
at Sussex, nothing in the law of copyright could prevent her from reporting the broadly-
paraphrased facts or ideas in a published article. Fair use, in the U.S. at least, would allow 
her to state as well that Woolf had described Eliot as “marmoreal” and as wearing “cadav-
erous green powder.” And, of course, once the copyright in the entry had expired, anyone 
could lawfully use the entry in its entirety, without any constraints.
So what does copyright have to do with protecting privacy? Very little, as a strict mat-
ter of law. Copyrights are primarily designed to safeguard economic rights, not privacy 
interests. Th e privacy of the deceased is something the law has little interest in anyway, and 
other areas of the law—such as defamation and the torts of “invasion of privacy” and “false 
light”—already off er protection to living persons in certain contexts. To use the ill-fi tting 
machinery of copyright to try to stifl e or discourage scholarly commentary is wrong and 
wrong-headed, in my opinion, yet the in terrorem eff ect of a copyright holder’s threats, 
however unjustifi ed, is often enough to cause a scholar or her publisher to omit quite 
reasonable quotations or paraphrased discussion, with the result that the documentary 
credibility of the scholar’s claims is reduced.
In the U.S., courts are increasingly recognizing the problem of “copyright misuse,” a 
term that generally refers to an attempt by a rights-holder to extend copyright protection 
beyond its appropriate sphere. Allegations of copyright misuse were a centerpiece of the 
lawsuit brought in 2006 by Professor Carol Loeb Shloss of Stanford University against 
the Estate of James Joyce.9 (I have served as co-counsel for Shloss in this litigation.)  Sh-
loss had spent years researching a controversial subject—the sparsely-documented life of 
James Joyce’s troubled daughter, Lucia—only to be forbidden by the Estate, for reasons of 
family privacy, to quote anything by Lucia, her father, or any Joyce family member, even 
though most of the documents the Estate declared off -limits were already published or 
held in collections open to the public. Th e case was settled—very favorably for Shloss—
but not before the court had ruled that her claim of copyright misuse was an appropriate 
subject for litigation on the basis of the facts she had alleged.10 Had the case continued, 
the court would have decided whether the Estate’s aggressive attempts to deny scholarly 
fair use and other user rights in the name of “privacy” had crossed a legal line.
Th e public domain is the scholar’s best friend, but when does a work fall into the 
public domain? Th e bad news is that copyright laws vary from country to country—
copyright law is territorial—and the rules for when works enter the public domain are 
not uniform. Th e good news, for Woolf scholars, is that public-domain status of Woolf ’s 
works, including her currently unpublished writings, is not far off  in some countries. Any 
work that Woolf published during her lifetime is now in the public domain in Canada 
and Australia, where copyrights of that vintage endure for the author’s life plus fi fty years. 
(Woolf died in 1941.) In the U.K., the Republic of Ireland, and many E.U. countries, 
copyrights last for the author’s life plus seventy years, so works published during Woolf ’s 
230 WOOLF EDITING / EDITING WOOLF
lifetime should enter the public domain in those countries at the end of 2011—barring 
any further legislative extensions of copyright.  
Th e U.S.—for many years a copyright self-exile from the rest of the world—has dif-
ferent rules for Woolf ’s lifetime-published works. Works published prior to 1923, in the 
U.S. or abroad, are generally in the U.S. public domain. Woolf ’s works published after 
1922—unless they entered the public domain in some other way—generally will enjoy 
copyright in the U.S. for 95 years from the date of fi rst publication.11 Th us, the fi rst edi-
tion of Jacob’s Room, published in New York and London in 1922, is now in the public 
domain in the U.S., Canada, and Australia, but will remain in copyright in Britain and 
other countries until at least 2011. By contrast, To the Lighthouse, published in 1927, 
will remain in copyright in the U.S. until the end of 2022 and in Britain until the end of 
2011, while it is in the public-domain now in Canada and Australia. It is diffi  cult, accord-
ingly, to make worldwide plans for texts when their copyrights do not expire uniformly. A 
complete study of the international copyright status of a given text should be made before 
embarking on any publication project.
You will notice that I have been using the term “lifetime-published works.”  What 
about works by Woolf that were published after her death?  Th e rules for posthumously-
published works are also complicated and diffi  cult to encapsulate, since they, too, vary from 
country to country.  In general, because many of Woolf ’s posthumously-published works 
were issued within the past few decades, they will likely enjoy copyright protection for some 
time to come in many countries.  One more point about Woolf ’s lifetime-published works: 
the copyright in these works had expired in the U.K. at the end of 1991, but were “revived” 
in that country in 1996 when copyright terms were extended by twenty years in many coun-
tries of the European Union.  To lessen the impact of revived copyrights, Britain enacted 
what are called “compulsory-license” provisions that permit anyone to make any use of a 
revived-copyright work within the U.K., as long as the user gives reasonable advance notice 
to the copyright owner and agrees to pay a reasonable fee or remuneration at some point.12 
Th is means that anyone in the U.K. could re-edit and publish, within the U.K., a critical 
edition of the fi rst printing of Mrs. Dalloway, after giving proper notice to the copyright 
holders and, at some point, paying a reasonable royalty or fee. Unfortunately, other E.U. 
countries in which Woolf ’s copyrights were revived, such as Ireland, lack such a compulsory 
license. Th is tends to limit the benefi ts of the U.K. compulsory license to the U.K., though 
it might be argued that the benefi ts could extend further in certain cases.
What about currently unpublished works by Woolf—letters, diary material, manu-
scripts? Here, too, the rules vary from country to country.  In Canada, any work by Woolf 
that was unpublished as of 1997 entered the public domain there at the end of 2002.13 
Th is makes Canada the only major English-speaking country in which Woolf ’s currently 
unpublished works (and any works by her published for the fi rst time after 1996 or so) 
are in the public domain. In the U.S., Woolf ’s currently unpublished works (and any 
works by her published for the fi rst time after 2002) will enter the public domain at the 
end of 2011.14 Th is means that, in the North American market, scholars will have a much 
freer hand with respect to Woolf ’s unpublished writings come 2012—though because 
copyright in Woolf ’s unpublished writings will remain in force longer in other countries, 
scholars will still have to seek permission for worldwide distribution.
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